Export Orientation in South Korea: How Helpful is Dependency Thinking to its Analysis? by Luedde-Neurath, Richard
Export Orientation in South Korea:
How Helpful is Dependency Thinking to its Analysis?
Richard Luedde-Neurath
In spite of South Koreas transformation in two decades
from one of the poorest nations in the world into one
of the newly industrialising countries, the dependency
approach has tended to treat the case merely as an
empirical confirmation of its analysis regarding the
consequences of export orientation by Ides cg Fröbel
1978. Frank 1979, McCormack 1977, Sunoo 19781.
The argument in this article is that such a view of the
Korean experience is both questionable and unhelpful.
lt is questionable because of is frequent reliance on a)
serious misrepresentations with respect to the nature
of the strategy pursued, b) understatements of the
progress made in Korea, coupled with exaggerations
of the problems encountered, and e) a failure to
acknowledge a number of developments pointing to a
greater degree of Korean independence and bargaining
strength. Meanwhile it is unhelpful because it misses
some of the most interesting features of the experience.
What is striking about Korea is not its conformity to
any simple and often mechanistic versions of
dependencyor for that matter of neoclassical
thinkingbut rather the particular way in which many
of the pitfalls of export orientation, so usefully exposed
by dependency analysis, were avoided, at least in part.
Given that data on many structural and qualitative
aspects of the Korean experience are relatively scarce
at present. no attempt can be made either to present a
comprehensive evaluation of the strategy or to settle
the debate in any way. It is hoped. however, that a
case can he made for a careful reconsideration of the
Korean experience and for more cautious applications
toit of the dependency approach.
Some Parameters of the Korean Case
Korea, with its 37mn inhabitants, is extremely deficient
in mineral, energy and land resources. Its population
density 374 persons per square km in 1978 is one of
the highest in the world. lt has no significant raw
materials other than some low grade coal and its
agricultural production is constrained by the fact that
only about 25 per cent of the land is flat enough for
cultivation. In the dikussion, therefore, it is important
to recognise that certain types of dependencesuch
as that on trade and, more specifically, on processing
for export so as to finance domestically consumed
importsare not caused by the strategy of export
orientation, but are, within limits, independent of it.
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Indeed, rather than blame such problems on the
strategy it is more appropriate to explain the choice of
strategy in terms of the implications for Korea of
such resource deficiencies.
In spite of its resource problems, Korea displayed a
number of internal characteristics by the early to mid
1960s. when the strategy was embarked upon, which
probably contributed substantially to its success but
were independent of it. These included: the homogeneity
of the nation: the experience of 'redistribution before
growth' as a result partly of the Civil War and partly of
two far reaching land reforms: the efficient, literate
and flexible nature of Korean labour, willingly or
unwillingly tolerant of a strict social discipline: the
emergence of viable local enterprises, organised along
the lines of the Japanese Zaibatsu: and finally, the rise
of a veiy powerful, highly centralised state I see Adelman
and Robinson 19781. What is particularly important
and unusual about the latter is that this government's
most important objective, apart from defence itself,
was rapid economic developmentessentially for the
sake of national security against the North Korean
threat.
In Korea's external environment there were also a
number of factors which favoured the success of the
strategy. Between 1953 and 1965 the vast volumes of
grant aid given to Korea by the USA made it possible
to reconstruct much of the economic infrastructure,
to engage in wide-spread human resource investments
and to satisfy basic consumption needs simultaneously
I Hasan 1976: 2161. This aid, induced largely by the US
commitment to the containment of communism in the
area, also meant that Korea had virtually no foreign
debt obligations in the early years of the strategy. The
later latter half of the 1960s was marked by Korea's
exports to, contracts in and remittances from Vietnam,
and more generally, by a rapid expansion of world
trade Frank et al 1975:231, Sano 1977: 45, Hassan
1976: 215).Whilst in the course of the 1970s, protec-
tionism and resouce nationalism (to some extent
counteracted by contracts in the Middle East) became
increasingly problematic for Korea. the fact remains
that the strategy was implemented in the context of
parameters which were on the whole rather favourable
to it.
Centrai Features of the Strategy
Had the Korean Government in this context embarked
upon an export strategy involving the indiscriminate
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promotion of free trade and foreign investment.
expecting market forces and transnational corporations
(TNCs) to act as the vehicles for the country's economic
development, then it might indeed have constituted a
straightforward case for dependency thinking. But
clearly that is not what occurred. The state, it appears.
has been far more active as an initiating, implementing
and controlling factor in the Korean economy than is
commonly recognised see Luedde-Neurath 1980. Kim
and Rogier 1976, Kim 1974. Ashdown 1979. Kuznets
and Sano 19771.
This finds reflection in the powerful policy tools with
which its economic objectivesas formalised in various
five year plans and in specific industrial promotion
lawscould he and were pursued. These included the
government's right directly to initiate industrial projects
and to designate specific firms to take them up: strict
financial control, which is likely to have been the
single most important directive tool (by maintaining a
tight control on all major financial institutions in
Korea, it could influence not only the distribution but
also the terms of creditfor favoured projects. real
interest rates were often zero or even negative): the
power to interfere directly with prices, profit margins.
taxes and even the organisation of enterprises by way
of selective measures directed at specific firms: and
finally, trade controls, which in Korea did not merely
comprise the commonly reported tariffs and selective
quantitative restrictions, but were supplemented by
certain highly effective direct measures. (Individuals
or firms required a licence and registration to engage
in foreign trade, in addition to which they often also
required a specific licence for every transaction: the
export-import link' system in turn could make permission
to import conditional on a satisfactory export per-
formance. Finally, special customs duties could be
imposed so as to curb excess profits on imports.)
All this was apart from the incentive measures and
fiscal and monetary policies often misleadingly presented
as the only tools operating in Korea to promote the
strategy. They were also accompanied by rather more
objectionable policies which imposed a strict social
discipline Ofl the work force.
As regards the external factors, first, the government
controlled the level as well as utilisation of foreign
loans by guaranteeing their repayment and by restricting
private off-shore borrowing. This measure was particu-
larly important. given that the vast majority of foreign
investment in Korea took the form of loans rather
than of direct investment. The government also ensured
complementarity between local and foreign banks in
Korea. This was done by stipulating that the main
source of funds of the latter should he borrowing from
their head office as opposed to local deposits, and that
lending on the local market should proceed via 'swap'
transactions with the Bank of Korea. As with domestic
banks, there was interference with the terms and
distribution of credit. Foreign direct investment was
controlled by prior screening and the frequent imposition
of export conditions as well as ownership share ratios,
even before 1974, when a more explicit and formal
distinction came to be made between eligible and
ineligible types of direct investments I see Cohen 1975:72.
lt is primarily in free trade zoneswhich employed
about I per cent of Korea's working population in
1975that government interference has indeed been
minimal, apart that is from the stipulation that all their
production must be exported.
lt should also be noted that foreign trading companies
may not operate in Korea, that the country's stock
market is off limits to foreigners and that Korea's
patent act appears to entail a curious provision
dealing wiih the limits of patent rights which seems
to suggest that infringement of patents is perm itted
if the goods are to be exported
I
Kim and Rogier 1976:470 I.
though the precise implications of these factors have
yet to be evaluated.
lt is the combination of policy tools rather than any
single one which has enabled the Korean Government
to mobilise and direct, but also to monitor and control,
both local and foreign factors in its economy. In
practice, the government has played a more inter-
ventionist role in the l970s than in the l960s: it is
hardly surprising that Korea has been described as
one of the free w orld : most tight/v supervised
economies, with the government initialing almost
cien' major investment br the private sector and
wielding enough power to ensure that companies
which make such investments also make a profit
IC. Smith. Financial Times supplement.
2April 1979:1111.
Naturally, noting the existence of such policy tools
does not tell us exactly who benefited from their
application; it might be large rather than small local
firms, or foreign as opposed to local enterprises.
Domestically. there is little doubt that a small number
of large enterprise groups were the main beneficiaries
rather than small firms. More relevant to the dependency
debate is the fact that the Korean government has
sought to promote national firms wherever possible
and to assign a specific complementary role to external
factors.
The evidence provided in this section is strongly at
variance with versions of dependency thinking which
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view the role of Korea's policy towards foreign elements
as unimportant, ineffective, or worst of all, as an
'instrument' of foreign capital see Frank 1979:241.
Without wishing to dispute the repressive nature of
the regime and the high profits earned by those
foreign interests which were admitted Leg Sunoo
1978:3241 we would suggest that, both directly via the
selection and control of foreign interests and indirectly
via the promotion of local enterprises, such policy
favourably affected the terms of Korea's integration
into the world economy and, further, that it served at
least partly to avoid some of the pitfalls that a more
naïve approach to export orientation may well have
entailed. However, many dependency analysts have
yet to accept this view. And it is only when Korea's
path is accepted as a clear deviation from the type of
strategy criticised by dependency thinking that far
more interesting issuesabout how the implementation
and maintenance of such a policy was possible, for
example, or about the extent and limits of the Korean
deviationscan be considered.
Some Results of the Strategy
Evaluations of policy achievements are much influenced
by the particular standards applied. Dependency thinking
has contributed in many ways to the demystification
of traditional yardsticks of development success, but
the impression is often unavoidable that the criteria by
which it assesses cases such as Korea are themselves
somewhat utopian. The achievements of the country
must always be assessed against the background of its
resource deficiencies and, more importantly. against
the tremendous problems facing the Third World in
general.
While we do not wish to suggest that Korea achieved
the best possible results, we hope to show in this
section that certain widespread 'dependency objections
to export orientation - that it fails to generate employ-
ment, does not improve real wages and worsens income
distribution, can be challenged in the Korean case.
while arguably the assertions made about 'chronic
balance of payments crises and debt problems have
been exaggerated. What we will not dispute is that
enormous social costs were incurred in the course of
the strategy.
Korea's success according to orthodox criteria, such
as nominal or per capita GNP growth. export expansion
or structural transformation in production and exports
in the direction of manufacturing and particularly
towards the heavy and chemical industries, is commonly
reported and can be taken as beyond dispute. so that
the relevant data will not be reproduced here.
The employed population in Korea increased from
7.7mn in 1963 to l3.5mn in 1978, with unemployment-
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at least according to the rather optimistic official
figuresfalling from 8 per cent to 3 per cent during
this period. In manufacturing, employment expanded
at 13 per cent a year between 1963 and 1977. which
makes Korea one of the few ldcs where the actual
growth of manufacturing employment has even approxi-
mately kept pace with the requirements (namely 14
percent) imposed by the mere expansion of the labour
force. As a result, objections to the Korean experience
on account of its failure to generate employment are
not convincing.
Official figures suggest a substantial rise in real incomes.
The index of real farm household income rose by 208
per cent between 1962 and 1978. The corresponding
index for salary and wage-earner households (all cities)
rose by 122 per cent in the same period, while that for
manufacturing real wages increased by 165 per cent
between 1968 and 1978. Absolute wages remain
extremely low by international standards, in spite of
such improvements.
Finally, there can be little doubt that a substantial
deterioration in income distribution has occurred, at
least during the 1970s see Choo and Kim 19781. In
spite of this however, Korea's income distribution
remains relatively equal by ldc standards, so that
attacks on the experience from this angle are ques'
tionable.
Dependency analysts are correct, however, when they
argue that if criteria such as absolute wage levels,
inflation, working day length. unemployment or medical
benefits, housing, pollution, safety precautions at work
or labour laws are considered, the experience is revealed
at its least impressive see Ashdown 1979, Suh 19791.
The social costs of the Korean model are not disputed
here, nor in our view can they be justified. Unfortunately,
however, very few ldcs can stand scrutiny according
to these rather fundamental criteria.
Korea has traditionally experienced a deficit in both
its visible trade and its payments accounts. But whereas
in 1962 imports were eight times as large as exports, by
1978 imports were only 20 per cent larger than exports.
While the latter grew on average at 40 per cent
annually between 1970 and 1978, imports grew at only
26 per cent in value terms during this period. Thus on
the whole the trend up to 1978 was towards a closing
trade gap. The overall balance of payments situation
has been mixed, but in some years, such as in 1977,
highly encouraging. Especially in recent years it has
been aided by invisible income, notably from con-
struction activities in the Middle East (the earnings
from which amounted to about USS2bn in 1978), so
that the chronic' problem did not materialise.
As far as external debt is concerned, the absolute
levels of Korean debt (outstanding, disbursed) have
increased rapidly from about US$1.8bn in 1970 to just
below USSllbn in 1978. Significantly, however, Korea
is one of the few newly industrialising countries where
the debt service as a percentage of exports of goods
and services fell between 1970 and 1977, namely from
19 to 9 per cent. Hence, even though foreign debt
always constitutes a potential problem, if exports
should become constrained or uncompetitive in future,
it has not represented a chronic problem to date.
Ironically, Korea's debt may turn out to constitute a
weapon against developed country (especially US)
protectionism, given that arguably it would be this
protectionism rather than lack of Korean export
competitiveness which would be at the root of any
default on its debt.
Summing up this section, it appears that the benefits
to Korea from the strategy of export orientation have
been understated by dependency analysis while the
problems have been exaggerated. That is not to deny,
however, that, according to many important criteria,
the experience is open to severe criticism, especially
in relation to its social costs. lt should also be noted
that the 1978-79 period has been marked by a reversal
of the trends described, though so far at least Korea's
ability to deal with economic crises has been remarkable
and has continuously defied dependency expecta-
tions.
Trends in Korean Dependence
In an absolute sense Korea has clearly increased its
dependence on the international system over the last
two decades. On the one hand, resource deficiencies
inevitably made the country more dependent on external
resources and markets as its economy expanded. On
the other hand, Korea's ambitious programme to
develop the capital, skill and technology intensive
heavy and chemical industries meant that its demands
on the international system shifted fundamentally
towards areas which are by their very nature more
inaccessible. It is important to recognise. however,
that these are symptons of success, not failure.
An area in which Korea has become more independent
is its financing of trade. Whereas in 1962 Korean
foreign exchange finanëed 42 per cent of the country's
imports, by 1978 this figure had risen to 82 per cent.
Furthermore, the purchasing power of Korean exports
has increased remarkably rapidly. In spite of adverse
movements in its net barter terms of trade (1975 = 100)
after 1968falling from 150 in that year to their
lowest level in 1975, but rising again to 128 by 1978the
purchasing power index of Korean exports (1970=100)
stood at 31 for 1966, at 281 for l975 but then, during
the 1976/77/78 period, rose to 436, 555 and 665
respectively.
These highly favourable developments, however, should
not distract from the potentially vulnerable nature of
Korean trade in other respects. First, a rather high 40
per cent of Korea's GNP is attributable to the export
of goods and services. Secondly, Korea's exports have
a high import component. given that between 1966
and 1977 the direct import content of its total commodity
exports was in the order of 40 per cent Isee Hong
1978:391. And, thirdly, Korean trade is highly con-
centrated geographically. In spite of certain diversifica-
tions since the mid 1960s, mainly toward Europe and
the Middle East, over 50 per cent of Korea's trade is
still with Japan and the USA. The former is the
country's main import supplier, while the latter is its
main market. And whereas Korea has gradually
transformed its trade deficit with most parts of the
world into a trade surplus, the deficit with Japan has
generally increased and in 1978 was nearly USS1.Obn
higher than Korea's overall trade deficit for that year
of US$2.3bn Isee Luedde-Neurath 19801.
On each of these levels, problems may arise or, indeed,
be imminent. To the extent that the nature of Koreas
structural integration into the global system is such as
to prevent the adjustments that may be necessary to
cope with such problemsfor example, reorientation
of production, increases in domestic value added or a
more balanced geographical distribution of tradeits
dependence on that system may indeed turn out to be
problematic. lt is not at all clear, however, that Korea
will be unable to adapt to the new realities of the world
economy, and hence the questions arising from the
vulnerabilities outlined should not be prejudged at this
stage.
Korea's gross fixed capital formation as a percentage
of GNP has risen from 14 per cent in 1962 to an
impressive 31 per cent in 1978. In view of this, it is
particularly significant that Koreas dependence on
foreign savings to finance such investments has fallen
from 83 per cent in 1962 to just over 10 per cent in
1978.
While foreign investment played a crucial role in
Koreas development strategy, most of this investment,
namely 94 per cent of the cumulative total between
1959 and 1978, took the form of loans as opposed to
direct investment. Much of the direct investment (65
percent by 1974) took the form of joint ventures. The
cumulative total direct investment by 1978 was US
S873mn, of which over one third was made in 1973-74
alone and more than another third in the 1976-78
period.
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If we accept that loans are less problematic than
direct investment, and joint ventures are preferable to
wholly owned subsidiaries from the point of view of
potential foreign control, it follows that Korea pursued
a relatively wise approach to foreign investment, thereby
probably avoiding some of the pitfalls that a great
reliance on direct investment may have entailed.
In essence, however, the issue of external control is
not resolved by pointing to the predominance of loans
and joint ventures in Korea. simply because foreign
domination can take many and rather subtle forms,
such as sub-contracting or technology licensing for
example. The difficulties arising from this cannot be
resolved here. Instead, four reasons will be suggested
why Korea may be acquiring a greater degree of
independence in the world system.
First, Korean indigenous firms are developing rapidly
by international standards. Among Fortune 's list of
the top 500 nonUS corporations, ranked according to
sales, nine Korean firms were present in 1977, compared
to three in 1976. The largest of these, a manufacturing
firm, improved its rank from 278th in 1976 to 78th in
1978, with sales of USS3.7bn. If we focus on the top
performances in terms of changes in sales or profits,
Korean firms are even among the top ten. In 1977 the
top three places, and in 1978 the third place, in terms
of increases in sales, were occupied by Korean firms.
In the corresponding category for increases in profits
both in 1977 and 1978, one Korean firm can be found.
Secondly, Korea is itself beginning to go transnational.
By June 1979, the cumulative total foreign investment
on the part of Korea was USSl34mn, involving 367
projects. Much of this investment, namely 31 percent.
occurred in the first half of 1979 alone.
Thirdly. Korea is developing its own channels of
marketing and to a lesser extent input procurement.
Korea's trading companies, inspired by their Japanese
counterparts and linked to the large business conglo-
merates of Korea, have been succesful in gaining
control of the country's exports since their establishment
in 1974. In 1975 they accounted forS per cent of such
exports, by 1978 for 32 per cent and in 1979 the
provisional figure was 36 per cent. Owing in part to
their enormous economies of scale, these companies
can distribute even small volumes of exports to a large
number of countries. Not unrelated is the fact that in
1978 Korean flag vessels transported no less than 46
per cent of the country's trade volume. lt should he
noted, however, that Koren trading companies do
not as yet figure importantly on the import side.
accounting for only 4 per cent of the Korean total in
1978. This may to some extent negate the benefits of
marketing and export control, Korea is attempting
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increasingly, however, to come to more direct
arrangements with its raw material suppliers.
Finally, the fourth reason for Korea's greater relative
independence is its increasing sophistication in the
procurement and absorption of technology. In many
areas it is clear that technology procurement deprives
Korea of a high share of its value added. The cumulative
total royalty payments by Korea between 1962 and
1978 amount to US230mn, while the figure for technical
service contracts amounts to US$37mn (1972-78). In
spite of this, however, some as yet rather subtle signs
of improvement are visible.
Currently the country is embarking on a major
programme to expand local research and development
activities. Technology licencing is being increasingly
preferred to joint venture arrangements, and Koreans
are vigorously attempting to resist foreign 'turnkey'
bidders for domestic construction contracts, in some
cases even 'packaging' such contracts so that foreign
firms must train Koreans in specific skills during their
activity in Korea. In shipbuilding and vehicle manu-
facture a diversification within the developed world of
technical assistance procurement is visible, and skilled
individuals from advanced nations are being engaged
in Korea so as to diffuse the technology embodied in
them. For example, Koreans have designed their own
colour television set by luring some Japanese engineers
to Korea.
Korea's capacity to absorb technology is also growing.
Symptomatic of this is the increasing Japanese reluctance
to supply advanced technology to Korea, even whe.n
in other countries such companies are searching for
customers. This occurred, for example in the case of
video-tape technology. Another example is the
adaptation of an American ground-to-air missile for
ground-to-ground use by adding Korean solid state
technology.
While the developments identified in this section with
respect to Korean trade, investment, local capital,
overseas investment, foreign trade networks and
technology may to some extent be counteracted by
other factors, or may be in their early stages. they must
nevertheless be taken into account by any serious
analysis of the Korean experience. What is more, they
are likely to constitute developments which provide
Korea with a greater degree of independence within
the international stem, in spite of its incresing absolute
dependence on the latter,
Dependency thinking on Korea to date, however.
generally fails to acknowledge the existence, let alone
the importance, of such movements. which have taken
place in spite of export orientation. And in ignoring
factors which modify its own predictions or even
negate them, it has tended to miss precisely those
aspects of the Korean experience which make the
case particularly interesting.
Conclusion
Perhaps the central conclusion of this article is that
the manner in which dependency thinking has so far
been applied to the Korean experience has not been
particularly helpful to its understanding. If anything, it
has posed obstacles to the analysis of the most interesting
features of the case.
The irrelevance of the type of dependency thinking
applied to the Korean case so far can be traced
primarily to its rigid perceptions and mechanistic
predictions with respect to the nature and outcome of
the interaction between Korea's internal factors and
their external environment. All too often, it seems,
theoretical preconceptions have taken precedence
over the careful analysis of the actual experience and
the policies at its root.
In a modified form, on the other hand, dependency
thinking can be extremely useful, indeed indispensable
for the analysis of cases such as Korea, when it is
perceived as a body of theories which expose potentially
problematic types of interaction between internal and
external factors of ldcs, as well as possible adverse
implications for their development.
Seen in this way, dependency thinking constitutes the
basis for an investigation of the extent to which such
problems have materialised, been modified or even
avoided in practice. In our view, it is this approach
which is likely to yield the most interesting questions
for investigation in the Korean case and which may in
turn throw a new light on the veiy nature of dependency,
orwhat is most important for ldcson how it might
be counteracted.
noie: the more general dependency references are not given
here but in the bibliography at the end of this Bulletin.
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